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ABSTRACT. In this article, I argue for an interpretation of Messick’s (1989)
theory of validity that supports a dialectical over a technical view of rationality
in making validity judgments. A primary theme underlying Messick’s theory is
the “Singerian” approach to inquiry where one system of inquiry is observed by
another in order to open “their underlying scientific and value assumptions to
public scrutiny and critique” (pp. 61–62). Against Markus (this issue), who argues
that a “completion” of Messick’s theoretical project is necessary to support a
single, best justified validity judgment for any given test use, I argue that Messick
has provided a means of maintaining validity theory and the judgments it supports
as ongoing accomplishments, always open to other perspectives, and critically
reflexive in light of those challenges.
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There is no surer path to awareness of unspoken preconceptions and
prejudgments than communicative encounters with others who do not
share them
(McCarthy, 1994, p. 92)
In this response, I offer a different interpretation of Messick’s (1989)
theory of validity from the one proposed by Markus (this issue)
– an interpretation that points in a substantially different direction
for the further development of validity theory. Markus’s reading,
I will argue, is derived from and points towards a technical view
of rationality where the goal is to develop inquiry procedures that
can unambiguously adjudicate among competing interpretations or
theories. In contrast, I will argue from and for a more dialectical
view of rationality, one that supports ongoing critical reflection
about our interpretations and theories in light of challenges from
alternative perspectives. In drawing this contrast, I don’t mean to
suggest that those of us who develop and use tests or other social
indicators do not regularly make practical decisions based upon
our best judgment of the available evidence. Nor do I mean to
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suggest that Markus’s perspective precludes the critical practices
and perspectives I have in mind. The issue is not really about what’s
possiblewithin different perspectives (as Bernstein, 1979 notes), it’s
about what’s emphasized, illuminated, or made more likely; what’s
relegated to the background as unimportant or impractical; and what
the impact of these prevailing emphases is on the actual practices of
social scientists and the communities they study and serve.
Markus argues that in order to achieve a unified theory of validity,
a synthesis must be completed between Messick’s evidential and
consequential bases of validity. For Messick, the evidential basis
encompasses construct validity plus evidence of the relevance and
utility of scores to the applied purpose and setting; the consequential
basis encompasses additionally the value implications and the social
consequences of test interpretation and use. Markus characterizes
Messick’s evidential basis of validity as “value independent” and
implying “one validity” for a given interpretation and use; whereas
he characterizes Messick’s consequential basis of validity as “value
dependent” and suggesting “different validities for different sets of
values” (p. 14). The synthesis Markus calls for entails the develop-
ment of a theory of value justification that can result in a single, best
justified value perspective and hence in a single validity for a given
interpretation or use.
Underlying this argument are a set of assumptions Markus
makes, with which I take issue, about aspects of Messick’s theory.
First is the assumption that the values implied in the consequential
basis of test interpretation and use are distinct from the facts that
would be generated in the evidential basis. Second is the assumption
that values, as Messick conceives them, are and remain pre-rational
and unjustified. Third is the assumption that Messick’s Singerian
approach to inquiry is analogous to Foucault’s archetypal symbol
of disciplinary technology, the Panopticon, and is intended to bring
inquiring systems that “get out of hand. . . back on line” (p. 8).
Fourth is the assumption that a unified theory of validity must
result in a single validity for a given interpretation and use. In this
response, I will describe and then confront each of these assump-
tions, in turn, with my own reading of Messick. The thrust of my
argument will be to highlight the dialectical view of rationality that
I believe is explicit in Messick’s work – a view which supports
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validity theory as an always ongoing accomplishment, open to
the challenge of new perspectives, rather than as a project to be
completed.
I should note that this plan does not exhaust the detailed substan-
tive argument in Markus’s text nor my friendly disagreements with
him. It does, however, emphasize those points that have, I believe,
the most important implications for subsequent work in validity
theory; and it permits a focused and coherent response in a limited
number of pages. I should also note that I am not as confident of
my reading of Markus as I would like to be. There are places in his
text where I cannot tell whether he is offering his own interpreta-
tion of Messick or speculating about what reasonable readers might
conclude. There are other places where Markus has taken seemingly
different stances that I haven’t yet been able to reconcile into a
coherent interpretation of his perspective. I welcome his response
and the opportunity it provides for him to contrast my reading of his
text with his own.
IS THERE A “CORRECT” INTERPRETATION OF MESSICK?
Before undertaking the main task of challenging Markus’s assump-
tions about Messick’s text, I want to begin by explaining how I think
two careful and respectful readers of Messick can come to such
different conclusions. I will do so by sharing my own “philosophical
conceits” about the nature of the dialogue in which Markus and I
(and our readers and reviewers) are engaged, and second, to preview
the dialectical view of rationality for and from which I argue.
The philosophers of social science whose work I (currently) find
most persuasive would argue that there is no single correct interpre-
tation that Markus or I can be seeking to approximate or against
which our interpretations can be unambiguously evaluated (e.g.,
Gadamer, 1987; Greene, 1994; Hoy and McCarthy, 1994; Kogler,
1996; Taylor, 1987; Thompson, 1990). While some have argued
(e.g., Hirsch, 1976) that the correct interpretation can be defined
in terms of the original intent of the author, and that the role of
interpreters is to bracket their prejudgments so as to reconstruct this
intended meaning, others argue that this argument misunderstands
understanding. Gadamer (1987), for instance, argues that there is
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no knowledge without foreknowledge – without preconceptions
or prejudices. “Understanding always implies a preunderstanding
which is in turn prefigured by the determinate tradition in which the
interpreter lives and that shapes his prejudices” (Gadamer, 1987:
p. 87). “The task is not to remove all such preconceptions, but
to test them critically in the course of inquiry. . . to make the all
important distinction between blind prejudices and ‘justified . . . [or
enabling] prejudices that are productive of knowledge” (Bernstein,
1985: p. 128). Gadamer draws the useful analogy to interpretation
in the reproductive arts (like the performance of a play): There is
no single correct interpretation – every interpreter brings his own
interpretation – but this is not an arbitrary interpretation that is
independent from the original text, there is “a definable degree of
appropriateness” (1987: p. 84).
This perspective does not imply that there are not better and
worse interpretations, or that our interpretations cannot be compara-
tively evaluated, rather it acknowledges that our interpretations are
necessarily contextualized and perspectival – that they involve a
dialectic between the text itself and the foreknowledge/values on
which we draw in interpreting it. Thus, understandingand learning
progress as our foreknowledge/prejudgments are revised through
respectful confrontation with others and with what we seek to
interpret.
In the sections that follow, I describe and respectfully challenge
(some of) the assumptions that Markus appears to make about
Messick’s theory. In doing so, I question Markus’s call for a theory
of value justification that will result in asinglebest justified validity
along with his characterization of a unitary theory of validity.
ASSUMPTION 1: FACTS ARE DISTINCT FROM VALUES
Markus describes Messick’s framework as if facts were distinct
from values: “The evidential basis [EB] is predicated upon a notion
of rationality as something independent of values (Apel, 1979).
Conversely the consequential basis [CB] is predicated on the diver-
sity of social values” (Markus, p. 12). “The tension between EB
and CB is therefore rooted in the division between facts and values”
(Markus, p. 25).
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TABLE I
[Messick’s] facets of validity
Test interpretation Test use
Eviential basis Construct validity Construct validity
+ relevance/utility
Consequential basis Value implications Social consequences
Note: In subsequent articles (e.g., Messick, 1994), the “progressive” nature
of the matrix is illustrated by having the contents of each cell include the
contents of all previous cells. So, for instance, construct validity appears in
every cell.
Messick characterizes validity in a two dimensional table that
distinguishes between interpretation and use on the one hand and
the evidential and consequential bases on the other. The eviden-
tial basis subsumes construct validity plus the relevance and utility
of test scores for the applied purpose and setting; the consequen-
tial basis additionally subsumes the value implications and social
consequences of test interpretation and use.
The issue underlying the differences between Markus and myself
has to do with how one interprets the categories and the lines
represented in Messick’s four-fold “facets of validity” matrix. Do
they represent distinct components of the concept which can be
considered separately from the others? Or do they simply name and
illuminate aspects of the concept so that they will not be lost from
our explicit consideration?
While I agree that the presentation of Messick’s facets of validity
can be read to support Markus’s assumption about the distinction
between facts and values; I believe the preponderance of evidence
in the larger text points to an integrated view of facts and values.
Consider the following:
Value implications are not ancillary but, rather, integral to score meaning.
. . . These distinctions may seem fuzzy because they are not only interlinked but
overlapping. (Messick, p. 20)
Elsewhere, Messick refers to the “the form-giving roles of values
in determining or distortingthe meaning of score interpretations
per se” (Messick, p. 59), and the way in which “broader ideologies
about the nature of humankind, society, and science. . . color our
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manner of perceiving and proceeding” (p. 59). He notes that “data
and values are intertwined in the conception of interpretation. And
this applies not just to evaluative interpretation, where the role of
values is often explicit, but also to theoretical interpretation more
generally, where values assumptions frequently lurk unexamined”
(p. 16). It thus appears that the evidential and consequential bases of
validity cannot be distinguished in terms of facts and values.
ASSUMPTION 2: VALUES ARE PRE-RATIONAL
AND WITHOUT JUSTIFICATION
Markus characterizes Messick’s view of values as being subjective
– pre-rational and without justification – and then raises the concern
that this subjective view of values makes it impossible to recon-
cile the evidential and consequential bases: “The assumption that
facts are objective and values are subjective goes unquestioned in
Messick’s theory . . . ” (Markus,1998: p. 2) “The resolution of the
incomplete synthesis requires a reappraisal of the assumption that
values lack rational justifications” (Markus, 1998: p. 4).
While Messick clearly addresses the ways in which values can
“lurk” beneath the surface of our awareness, he argues that one of
the goals of validity research is to illuminate and rationally evaluate
those values: “emphasis is also given to the need for empirical and
rational grounding of the value aspects as well as the substantive
aspects of construct meaning” (p. 59). That is the express purpose
of his Singerian approach to inquiry to which we will return in a
moment.
Labeling scientific judgments as value judgements, as opposed to factual or
theoretical judgments, does not absolve them from the need to be supported
empirically or to be rationally defended against criticism. . . The intent is toillu-
minate the scientific and value assumptions of constructs and theories so that
they may be subjected to either empirical grounding or policy debate, or both.
(Messick, 1989: p. 63)
There is little question that Messick believes value perspectives can
and should be justified. The only question is whether that justifica-
tion must result in a uniquely or best justified evaluation. That is the
issue to which I turn in the following sections.
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ASSUMPTION 3: THE SINGERIAN APPROACH TO INQUIRY IS
INTENDED TO BRING INQUIRING SYSTEMS THAT HAVE
GOTTEN “OUT OF HAND. . . BACK INTO LINE”
One of the primary themes that underlies Messick’s validity theory
is represented in the Singerian approach to inquiry (Churchman,
1971; Singer, 1985, in Messick, in 1989) where one method of
inquiry is evaluated in terms of another to highlight the assumptions
and values underlying each. As Messick describes it:
A Singerian inquiring system starts with the set of other inquiring systems. . . and
applies any system recursively to another system, including itself. The intent is to
elucidate the distinctive technical and value assumptions underlying each system
application and to integrate the scientific and ethical implications of the inquiry.
(p. 32)
Markus analogizes Messick’s Singerian inquiry to Foucault’s
paradigmatic symbol of disciplinary technology, the panopticon:
“The idea is to arrange the individual systems of inquiry into a
scientific panotpicon (Foucault, 1979/1975) in which systems each
observe one another. If one gets out of hand, the other is there to
bring it back into line” (p. 8).
For those who are unfamiliar with Foucault’s work, the Panot-
picon characterizes both a physical structure and a symbol of the
means through which disciplinary technology exercises power over
others (Foucault, 1977). Physically, the panopticon is an architectual
plan intended to permit the monitoring and control of institu-
tionalized populations. Dreyfus and Rabinow (1982) summarize
Foucault’s characterization of its architectural features:
It consists of a large courtyard with a tower in the center and a set of buildings,
divided into levels and cells, on the periphery. In each cell there are two windows:
one brings in light and the other faces the tower, where large observatory windows
allow for the surveillance of the cells. . . The inmate is not only visible to the
supervisor, he isonlyvisible to the supervisor; he is cut off from any contact with
those in adjoining cells . . . The inmate cannot see if the guardian is in the tower or
not, so he must behave as if surveillance is constant, unending, and total. (p. 189)
Foucault analogizes this physical symbol to multiple disciplinary
technologies (such as those operative in prisons, factories, military
institutions, hospitals, and schools) – any place where hierarchical
observations (e.g., through examinations) and normalizing judg-
ment locates people on a grid on which they can be compared. The
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effect of panoptic technology is manipulation and control where
others, perceiving themselves to be under constant surveillance,
participate in their own domination and “normalization.”
Analogizing Singerian inquiry to panoptic technology reflects, I
believe, an unfortunate reading of Messick – unfortunate in the sense
that it undermines the potential of his theory to promote ongoing
critical reflection and evolution in light of (sought-after) challenges
from alternative perspectives. The point of Singerian inquiry is not
to bring inquiring systems that have “gotten out of hand. . . back
into line” (Markus, p. 8). Rather the point is to illuminate taken
for granted practices and perspectives so that they can be critically
evaluated by all involved:
It is precisely such mutual confrontation of theoretical systems, especially in
attempting to account for the same data, that opens their underlying scientific
and value assumptions to public scrutiny and critique. (Messick, pp. 61–62)
If I had to analogize Messick’s Singerian inquiry to an aspect
of Foucault’s work, I would analogize its purpose to the purpose
of Foucault’s genealogies. One role of genealogical inquiry is to
highlight the “disqualified” knowledges “against the claims of a
unitary body of theory which would filter, hierarchise and order
them in the name of some true knowledge and some arbitrary idea
of what constitutes science and its objects” (Foucault, 1980: p. 82).
It is “through the reappearance of this knowledge. . . that criticism
performs its work” (Foucault, 1980: p. 82). This emphasis on the
importance of an outside perspective to illuminate what is taken
for granted (as natural, normal, the ‘way things are done’) and
thereby to provoke critical self-reflection is a theme that resonates
across multiple philosophies of social science (e.g., Bernstein, 1985,
1992; Gadamer, 1979; Habermas, 1990; Greene, 1994; Hoy and
McCarthy, 1994; Kogler, 1996) It is, in my judgment, one of the
most profoundly important insights that Messick has brought to the
tradition of educational and psychological measurement.
ASSUMPTION 4: A UNITARY THEORY OF VALIDITY
REQUIRES A SINGLE VALIDITY ASSESSMENT
Markus’s argument rests, I believe, on the assumption that a unitary
theory of validity requires a single uniquely or best justified validity
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assessment: “The theory is presented as a unified theory of validity.
That is ‘validity’ in the singular. . . The unified emphasis is on
combining various lines of evidence for this validity” (p. 13). The
problem he constructs is to find a way to “reconcile the plurality of
social values [implied in Messick’s consequential basis of validity]
with the singularity of validity” (p. 13). The solution he proposes
is to develop a theory of value justification that will result in a
single validity assessment through one of three outcomes: (a) a
uniquely justified validity assessment, (b) a validity assessment that
is “indexed to specific sets of factual contingencies” (p. 26) and
therefore uniquely justified for each contingency, or (c) a validity
assessment that can be “ordered in a gradient of justification” and
“stand out as most justified” (p. 27). Markus sees the completion
of this synthesis, brought about through an appropriate theory of
value justification that produces a best justified value, as “central to
achieving a unified theory of validity” (p. 4).
In my judgment, defining a unitary theory of validity as one
that results in a single validity assessment goes beyond what
Messick means by the concept. Messick defines validity as “an
integrated evaluative judgment of the degree to which empirical
evidence and theoretical rationales support the adequacy and appro-
priateness of inferences and actions based on test scores or other
modes of assessment” (p. 13). With respect to the unitary nature of
the concept, he notes that “Although there are different sources and
mixes of evidence for supporting scored based inferences, validity
is a unitary concept. Validity always refers to the degree to which
empirical evidence and theoretical rationales support the adequacy
and appropriateness of interpretations and actions based on test
scores” (p. 13). This characterization is consistent with Markus’s
emphasis on combining multiple lines of evidence, but it stops short
of calling explicitly for a single (uniquely or best justified) outcome,
and so it’s not yet clear whether Messick would agree with Markus’s
interpretation.
A bit of history might help here. The earliest testing standards
(APA, 1954, 1966) characterized different types of validity (e.g.,
content validity, construct validity, criterion-related validity) which
were associated with different types of inferences – from the test
score to a content domain, from the test score to a criterion variable,
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or from the test score to a psychological construct that could not be
defined by a content domain or a criterion variable. Since then, these
“types” have come to be understood as types of evidence supporting
a unified notion of validity. This is reflected in the 1985Standards’
use of the term content-, construct-, and criterion-relatedevi encein
characterizing its “unitary concept” of validity. As Messick notes,
“The varieties of evidence are not alternatives but rather supple-
ments to one another. This is the main reason that validity is now
recognized as a unitary concept” (p. 60).
Messick is careful to note that validity judgments are on-going
accomplishments and validation an evolving process, always open
to new evidence and theories.
It is important to note that validity is a matter of degree, not all or none.
Furthermore, over time, the existing validity evidence becomes enhanced (or
contravened) by new findings, and projections of potential social consequences of
testing become transformed by evidence of actual consequences and by changing
social conditions. Inevitably, then, validity is an evolving property and validation
is a continuing process. Because evidence is always incomplete, validation is
essentially a matter of making the most reasonable case to guide both current
use of the test and current research to advance understanding of what test scores
mean. (Messick p. 13)
Practically speaking then, validation is matter of making the most
reasonable case with the available evidence while recognizing that
these judgments will evolve as new evidence is brought to bear.
Elsewhere in Messick’s text, there are statements that appear to
more directly challenge the presumption that validity theory must
support convergence on a single outcome. Consider the following
passages:
This [striving for consistency between trait implications and the evaluative impli-
cations] could prove difficult, however, because some traits, such as self-control
and self-expression, are open to conflicting value interpretations. These cases may
call for systematic examination of counterhypoeses about value outcomes –if
not to reach convergence on an interpretation, at least to clarify the basis of the
conflict(Messick, p. 60; italics mine).
The very recognition of alternative perspectives about the social values to be
served, about the criteria to be enhanced, or about the standards to be achieved
should be salutary in its own right. This is so because to the extent that alternative
perspectives are perceived as legitimate, it is less likely that any one of these
perspectives will dominate our assumptions, our methodologies, or our thinking
about the validation of test use. (Messick, p. 88)
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While acknowledging the practical reality of needing to make the
best judgments we can with the available evidence, Messick also
highlights the ever-present obligation to challenge those judgments
with new evidence and theory and acknowledges the possibility that
different perspectives may not converge.
CONCLUDING COMMENTS
Markus writes as if Messick has provided us with a vision of the end
of the philosophy of social science, at least as it informs validity
theory – “the reader may want to reflect on the success of this
narrative in suppressing any doubts that we are indeed at the end
of history” (p. 5) – and that if we can complete the difficult work
of synthesizing the evidential and consequential bases of validity,
we will have achieved it. The theorists I read would argue that
any such perception of “completion,” consistent with a technical
view of rationality, is dangerous: it risks narrowing “the range of
the rational to what can be known with specific methods, thereby
excluding whatever does not fit into this domain” (Hoy, p. 125). As
McCarthy argues: “Intersubjective recognition of truth claims has to
be on-goingingly accomplishedthrough rationally persuading one
audience after another that it is ‘reasonable’ to accept them, that
is, that there are good reasons for doing so, better reasons than for
accepting any of the available alternatives” (McCarthy, p. 76). It’s
true that within a more technical view of rationality “supposedly
true facts can always be reexamined” (Hoy, p. 123), but what is
missing from that picture is the illumination of taken-for-granted
assumptions, values, and practices that alternative perspectives can
provoke.
Messick’s Singerian approach to inquiry is a powerful means of
maintaining the openness of validity theory – one that has tremen-
dous potential for pushing our field forward. It opens our work
not only to the voices that Messick has engaged in his chapter,
those voices which, as he said, can be used to rationalize current
validity thinking (p. 22), but also to all the voices we have yet to
encounter or engage within our profession. It serves both a critical
and a generative function, by simultaneously encouraging us to
consider alternative methodologies and illuminating our own taken
for granted practices for critique.
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I know those of us engaged in the practical work of the devel-
opment, evaluation, and use of social indicators will find such a
perspective daunting. As I said at the outset, a dialectical view
of rationality doesn’t preclude us from making the best practical
judgments we can with the information we have. It does, however,
encourage us to be more cautious about the meaningfulness and
the consequences of those judgments and it places a burden on
the profession at large to support a critically reflexive research
enterprise.
And so, I believe Messick has given us something far more valu-
able than a vision of a happy ending to the history of the philosophy
of social science. Rather, he’s given us the means of maintaining
validity theory as an ongoing accomplishment, always open to other
perspectives, and critically reflexive in light of those challenges. As
Bernstein (1992) reminds us, “this kind of pluralistic dialogue is
the responsibility of participants in any vital substantive tradition”
(p. 66).
NOTE
∗ Written in response to Keith A. Markus’s article, “Science, Measurement, and
Validity: Is Completion of Samuel Messick’s Synthesis Possible?”
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